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Abstract: 
Differentiated vehicle taxes are considered as a useful tool for promoting 
environmental friendly vehicles. Such a tax was introduced in Denmark in 2007. 
During 2007, the pattern in new vehicle purchases in Denmark changed toward more 
diesel vehicles and more fuel-efficient vehicles. We analyse to what extent the 2007 
vehicle tax reform may explain these changes in purchasing behaviour using a 
discrete choice model. The model allows us to simulate the effect of price changes 
that resemble those induced by the tax reform. The analysis shows that the reform 
only changes purchase patterns slightly. The changes in fuel prices during the year 
induce a similar minor effect in our simulation. We conclude that while the tax reform 
appeared in the same year as a large increase in fuel efficiency, it only explains a 
small part of the shift in fuel efficiency that happened. 
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1. Introduction 
The fuel efficiency of new cars registered in Denmark during 2007 rose throughout 
the year and there was an increase in the diesel share from 0.24 before May to 0.40 
after May 2007. The average fuel efficiency increased from 15.9 km/l in the first 
trimester to 17.4 km/l in the remainder of the year. For petrol cars fuel efficiency rose 
from 15.1 km/l to 15.8 km/l and for diesel cars it rose from 18.5 km/l to 19.8 km/l.  
The changes in vehicle purchasing behaviour happened in a year where both the 
vehicle registration tax was differentiated following a tax reform and fuel prices rose. 
We hypothesise four reasons for these changes in purchasing behaviour related to 
fuel economy and fuel type. 
1) Seasonal variation 
2) Fuel price variation 
3) The tax reform 
4) Changes in preferences  
In 2006 the average fuel efficiency increased from 15.8 km/l to 16.0 km/l and the 
diesel share increased from 0.20 to 0.23. This pattern is representative of the years 
prior to 2007. This observation removes seasonal variation as an argument for the 
changes observed in 2007.  
Fuel prices rose through 2007, so this could explain some of the changes in 
purchasing behaviour. Therefore we control for the expectations about fuel prices at 
the time of purchase. Our model will then allow us to investigate to what extent fuel 
price variations affected purchasing behaviour. 
In May 2007, the registration tax of a new car was differentiated according to the fuel 
efficiency of the car. The tax reform changed the new-vehicle price. A petrol car with 
fuel efficiency above 16 km/l became cheaper while those with fuel efficiency below 
16 km/l became more expensive. For diesel cars the threshold was at 18 km/l.  
Therefore we will analyse the reform using a model that incorporates the consumer 
sensitivity toward vehicle price. 
The changes in purchasing behaviour may be due to changes in preference, e.g. 
related to fuel economy. While this may be a valid reason for the changes in 
behaviour we will not be able to include them in the present analysis. If we allowed 
for changes in preferences this would be able to explain the changed behaviour 
completely and an analysis of the tax reform would be impossible. Therefore the 
analysis will be conditional on this aspects.  
Finally, changes in technology in the vehicles could also drive a shift in fuel types 
and fuel economy. But these changes are calculated independently of technological 
changes in the new vehicles since they are based on vehicle types that are averages 
across 2007 and 2008 models. So this does not explain the changes.  
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We develop a discrete choice model to capture vehicle purchasing behaviour. Using 
our model we analyse the 2007 vehicle tax reform to see to what extent the reform 
may explain the changes in purchasing behaviour. We use a disaggregate model 
based on random utility maximisation to describe behaviour. In this way we follow 
the general framework used in, e.g. Manski and Sherman (1980). Literature reviews 
of more recent applications of the same methodology may be found in Potoglou and 
Kanaroglou (2007) and De Jong et al. (2004). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we discuss 
the modelling framework used to analyse vehicle type choice. The following section 
3 presents the data and the estimation results. Section 4 discusses the effect of the 
tax reform and the fuel price variation applying the model to several scenarios. The 
final section 5 presents a conclusion and some future directions of research. 
 
2. Model formulation 
The model should be able to capture the effect of the tax reform on the new vehicle 
market. Some tax reforms may have the intention to make individuals switch away 
from buying a car or toward buying a new car instead of a used car. Such changes 
are outside the scope of this paper as they would demand a more general modelling 
approach. Therefore we make the assumption that the tax reform only alters the 
distribution of vehicle types chosen but not the underlying population of new-car 
buyers. Given that the price changes induced by the reform are small compared to 
the overall vehicle prices in Denmark this seems like a reasonable assumption for 
the present tax reform, see section 3.1 for a price example. The model presented 
here models the vehicle choice conditional on the decision to buy a new car. This is 
similar to the approach used in Manski and Sherman (1980) as well as Train and 
Winston (2007). 
As modelling framework we use random utility maximisation (RUM). We assume that 
each individual, indexed n=1,...,N, for each alternative j has a utility function, Unj, and 
then chooses the alternative with maximum utility. In our case, the choice set J 
consists of 424 vehicle alternatives. We assume the utilities 
(1)    Unj =  δj + β'xnj + εnj, 
where the δj's are the alternative-specific constants, the xnj's consist of the vehicle 
attributes and interactions with socio-economic variables, the β's are coefficients, 
and the εnj's are error terms assumed to be distributed as IID standard EV1. This is a 
linear-in-parameters multinomial logit (MNL) model. 
Given the distributional assumptions on the error terms this model may be estimated 
by maximum likelihood. This is a fairly simple approach but given the dimension of 
the δ = (δj) – vector we will only use partial maximum likelihood as suggested in 
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Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) hereafter BLP. Given the assumption about 
RUM and the utility specification in equation 1, we have 
(2)    Pn( i | δ,β ) =  exp(δi + β'xni ) / Σj exp(δj + β'xnj ). 
If  denotes the market share of alternative j in the population and  the predicted 
share by the model, then the procedure works as follows: 
1) Estimate the model P(i| δ, β) conditional on a δ-vector 
2) Calibrate the δ-vector using the corrections dj = ln( )-ln( ).  
Repeat 2) until the corrections are sufficiently small. 
Step 1 uses standard maximum likelihood to estimate β. In step 2 we calculate the 
difference dj and update the jth element of δ using δj‘ = δj + dj, where δj‘ is the new 
alternative-specific constant. Then we calculate the max norm of δ to judge whether 
to exit the procedure or redo step 2. 
3. Data, specification, and estimation results 
3.1 Data  
We have a sample of 9,533 individuals who registered a new vehicle in 2007. The 
sample is a random sample (approx. 10 %) from the population of Danish new-car 
buyers in 2007. We see each individual as having made a choice from a choice set 
of 424 alternatives, where each alternative is defined by make, model, fuel and car 
type, e.g. a Ford Mondeo station car using petrol. Each alternative covers a number 
of subvariants. The vehicle attributes used to describe the alternatives are presented 
in Table 1. 
Variable Description 
Airbag4 Dummy for more than 4 airbags 
Auto Dummy for automatic transmission 
Cost Purchase price plus weighted annual tax in 100,000 DKK 
Diesel Dummy indicating diesel vehicles   
Doors4 Dummy for 4 or more doors 
HP per kg ln(Horse power in kWh divided by own weight in tons) 
No. of variants ln(Number of subvariants included in an alternative) 
Operation cost Fuel costs in DKK for driving 100 km 
Weight Total weight in tons 
Class3 Dummy for compact/large vehicles 
Class4 Dummy for large/executive vehicles 
Class7 Dummy for MPVs 
Class8 Dummy for SUVs 
Table 1: Description of the vehicle attributes.  
As noted in Table 1, the cost is found as the sum of the purchase price and the 
annual cost weighted. The weight for annual cost is 4 as it was found to be the 
average Danish WTP for annual cost in an SP study, see Mabit and Fosgerau 
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(2011). The purchase prices used are list prices ultimo 2007. To find the price of a 
vehicle purchased before May (i.e. before the reform) we apply the price changes 
due to the reform backwards. Table 2 presents an example of the price changes due 
to the reform. The reform altered the vehicle registration tax in the following way. 
Petrol vehicles driving x km/l more than 16 km/l and diesel vehicles driving x km/l 
more than 18 km/l were rebated 4000x DKK. Petrol vehicles driving x km/l less than 
16 km/l and diesel vehicles driving x km/l less than 18 km/l were added 1000x DKK.   
Vehicle Fuel Fuel economy Price before Price after 
  (km/l) (DKK) (DKK) 
Audi A6 station car Petrol 10.4  841,450  847,050 
Peugeot 107 hatchback Diesel 24.4 140,900 115,300 
Table 2: Price changes due to the tax reform in two vehicles.  
Operation cost is measured as the fuel cost to drive 100 km. For this calculation we 
use average fuel price across both petrol and diesel. The reasons for using the 
average across fuel types are discussed in section 3.2. We average the fuel price 
across the 4 months prior to the purchase, i.e. the fuel price used represents an 
individual-specific expectation. The horizon of one month was compared to other 
durations and gave the best results measured on model fit. The average fuel price 
using this approach had a low in February at 8.6 DKK/l and a high in December at 
10.1 DKK/l. 
To describe the vehicle purchasers we include relevant socio-economic variables in 
the model. These are presented in Table 3.   
Variable Description 
Female Dummy for female individuals 
Unemployed Dummy for unemployed individuals 
Single Dummy for individuals who are only adult in household 
Child Dummy for individuals living together with children 
Income After tax monthly household income 
Age Age of individual 
Distance Dummy for one-way commute distance above 25 km 
Copenhagen Dummy for individuals living in Copenhagen 
Table 3: Characteristics of car buyers  
 
3.2 Estimation results 
We estimated the model using partial maximum likelihood estimation together with 
the calibration procedures described in section 2. The estimation was done using a 
specific program written in Ox, see Doornik (2001). The estimation results are 
presented in Table 4. The final log-likelihood was LL = -51507.8 which gives
. 
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Coefficient Estimate T value 
Airbag4 0.12 4.2 
Auto -0.75 -3.4 
Diesel -0.65 -9.2 
Doors4 0.07 1.3 
HP per kg 0.27 2.5 
No. of variants 0.43 34.2 
Weight 1.07 7.7 
Class3 0.56 13.4 
Class4 1.06 10.6 
Class7 0.24 6.0 
Class8 0.94 12.9 
Operation cost -0.05 -18.2 
Cost -0.59 -21.1 
Cost*Female -0.52 -22.6 
Cost*Unemployed -0.04 -1.3 
Cost*Single 0.34 7.0 
Cost*Child -0.06 -2.0 
Cost*Income 0.73 34.3 
Weight*Single -1.74 -9.2 
Weight*Child 0.68 4.9 
HP per kg * Age -0.01 -1.5 
Diesel * Age -0.02 -9.8 
Diesel * Female -0.25 -4.8 
Diesel * Unemployed -0.34 -4.6 
Diesel * Distance 0.56 10.0 
Diesel * Copenhagen -0.84 -13.0 
Table 4: Estimation results for the MNL model.  
The estimation results show that all the parameters are significant at the 95% level. 
Below we discuss the parameters related to the most important attributes. 
The base for the cost parameter is an employed male in a two-adult household 
without children with average income, i.e. 34,000 DKK. For this group we see that 
the cost parameter is negative as expected. We see that it is even more negative for 
females, unemployed individuals, and households with children. For single-adult 
households it is less negative. The cost parameter also shows the expected pattern 
with respect to income, i.e. individuals with higher income are less sensitive towards 
cost. These effects all seems reasonable and in line with results found in the 
literature. The combined effect of the heterogeneity in the cost parameter means that 
some individuals have a positive coefficient. This is of course not reasonable since 
an individual should not have positive marginal utility of cost. It happens because we 
capture only the 1. order effects of the socio-economic interactions with cost. In our 
sample it is a problem for less than 2 %. Therefore we keep the model in spite of this 
minor theoretical inconsistency. 
Related to the parameter on fuel costs, we tested splitting the fuel price on average 
petrol and diesel prices. This test lead to a poorer model fit. Because diesel is 
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cheaper in Denmark the model with two fuel prices implies that an individual should 
value the unit cost per 100 km less for diesel vehicles. The result indicates the 
opposite, i.e. that individuals buying a diesel vehicle value operation costs higher. To 
capture this we would have to estimate separate coefficients on operating cost for 
petrol and diesel alternatives. But such a model would not make sense for a single 
individual as the individual’s marginal utility of operation cost should not depend on 
fuel type. Hence we stay with the simpler version of the model with only one 
coefficient.  
The diesel parameter shows a dislike of diesel vehicles everything else equal. This is 
a common finding in Danish vehicle type models reflecting the fact that the diesel 
share traditionally has been very low in spite of the lower operation cost of diesel 
vehicles. A possible explanation for this is that diesel vehicles have a past reputation 
of being more pollutant. The socio-economic interactions with diesel have the 
expected signs. Females are known to be more concerned with pollution while the 
other interactions reflect that diesel vehicle are less attractive to individuals with no 
or short commuting while attractive to those with a long commute. 
The parameter related to the number of subvariants is positive as it should be and 
very significant, see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) for further discussion concerning 
aggregation of alternatives. This shows the importance of a supply aspect not often 
included in vehicle type modelling. 
There are two performance attributes HP per kg and Weight. Both of these have the 
expected positive sign. The first is related to the acceleration of the vehicle while the 
second is related to safety, size, and luggage space. Given these relations the socio-
economic interactions have reasonable signs. 
Finally, we have a group of dummies with reasonable signs. The base for car 
classes are subcompact vehicles and smaller.  
 
4. Illustration 
To investigate the extent to which the tax reform may explain the behavioural 
changes in vehicle purchases in 2007 we simulate how the model would predict the 
average fuel economy and diesel share for purchases before the tax reform and for 
purchases after the reform both with and without the reform. The results are shown 
in Table 5.  
 Jan-Apr May - December 
   
With expected fuel price No reform No reform Tax reform 
Average fuel economy (km/l) 16.69 16.91 17.11 
Diesel share (frequency) 0.331 0.348 0.358 
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With constant fuel price    
Average fuel economy (km/l) 16.78 16.87 17.07 
Diesel share (frequency) 0.339 0.343 0.355 
Table 5: Average fuel economy and fuel type with and without the tax reform. 
To find the numbers reported, we calculate the market shares of each alternative for 
each scenario using the model reported in section 3.2. Given these market shares 
we find the diesel share directly by adding market shares for petrol and diesel 
alternatives respectively. To find the average fuel economy we calculate the average 
using the market share in the three scenarios as weights.  
The difference between the first two columns, Jan-Apr and May-December with “No 
reform”, is that we use the respective parts of the sample to simulate the average 
statistics. The difference between the simulations using the “Tax reform” and “No 
reform” for purchases following May 2007 is that we apply either the price with the 
effects of the tax reform or without, respectively.  
The upper half of Table 5 reports the statistics using the expected fuel price, i.e. the 
prices applied in the modelling. These results show that our model would only predict 
an increase in the diesel share from 0.331 to 0.358 and that the reform does only 
account for little of this increase as the share is predicted to be 0.348 without the 
reform. Likewise the results for average fuel economy show that this would increase 
from 16.69 to 17.11 km/l and that average fuel economy without the reform would 
have increased to 16.91. 
The lower half of Table 5 reports the statistics using the annual average of the fuel 
price, for all individuals. This is done to illustrate how much of the changes in the 
upper half that are due to rising fuel prices. The results show that there is still a small 
increase in average fuel economy and the diesel share in the two “No reform” 
scenarios but most of it disappears when we remove the effect of rising fuel prices. 
These changes come from minor differences in the population purchasing before 
and after the tax reform. This could arise because some individuals postponed or 
hurried their purchase due to the reform. While this switches a few individuals 
between the before and after tax reform period, it does not violate our general 
assumption that the reform changes the population of new-car buyers. The results 
are similar for the diesel share. This shows that much of the differences in the results 
without a reform are due to increasing fuel prices. 
5. Conclusion and future research 
In this paper we analyse to what extent the 2007 vehicle tax reform explain the 
changes in vehicle purchasing behaviour. We develop a discrete choice model to 
capture vehicle purchasing behaviour and using our model we analyse the tax 
reform. The analysis shows that the reform only changes purchase patterns slightly. 
The changes in fuel prices during the year induced a similar minor effect. Overall 
neither the tax reform nor fuel price changes induce the effects observed in the data. 
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This indicates that changes in preference may be the major factor behind the shift in 
fuel economy and fuel type.  
An approach to improve the modelling would be to include information related to 
second choices as introduced by BLP. Another factor that could improve the 
modelling of vehicle choice could be to incorporate some concept of brand loyalty as 
discussed in Train and Winston (2007). 
While both of these extensions could improve the modelling approach applied in the 
paper they may not change the conclusions concerning the effects of the tax reform 
much. BLP observe that the MNL model captures the same average effects as found 
in their more advanced model.  
Another direction of research could be to include some indicators of preference 
changes, e.g. a measure of the public debate about the environment. 
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